We present results of practical sending-or-not quantum key distribution. In real-life implementations, we need consider the following three requirements, a few different intensities rather than infinite number of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate size rather than infinitely small size and the statistical fluctuations. We first show the decoy-state method with only a few different intensities and a phase slice of appropriate size. We then give a statistical fluctuation analysis for the decoy-state method. Numerical simulation shows that, the performance of our method is comparable to the asymptotic case for which the key size is large enough. Our results show that practical implementations of the sending-or-not quantum key distribution can be both secure and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to share unconditional secret keys based on the laws of quantum physics [1, 2] , even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. However, in real-life implementations of QKD, it's practical security is still questionable due to the device imperfections, such as the imperfect source and detectors. Fortunately, by using the decoy-state method [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , it has been shown that the unconditional security of QKD can still be assured with an imperfect single-photon source [14, 15] . To avoid the detector side channel attacks, the measurement-deviceindependent QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed [16, 17] . The decoy-state MDI-QKD can remove all detector sidechannel attack with imperfect single-photon sources.
With the developments [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] in both theory and experiment, it is more and more hoped to extensively applied in practice, though there are barriers for so. Among them, the transmission loss of photons for long distance QKD has become the major obstacle in practical implementations. Very recently, with the technology of long distance single-photon interference, the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has been presented [22] . The original TF-QKD does not offer the informationtheoretic security. By switching between a Test mode and a Code mode, the TF-QKD* protocol with informationtheoretic security has been shown [24] . A more efficient protocol for TF-QKD with sending or not sending the coherent state has been given in [25] . In the sending-or-not protocol [25] , Alice and Bob do not take post selection * Email Address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn † Also a member of Center for Atomic and Molecular Nanosciences at Tsinghua University for the bits in Z basis (signal pulses) and hence the traditional calculation formulas directly apply.
In Ref. [25] , a security analysis is provided for sendingor-not QKD asymptotically. In the asymptotic case, the number of different intensities is infinite, the phase slice is infinitely small and the key size is large enough. However, in any real implementations, these requirements can no be fulfilled. In practice, we need consider the situations with a few different intensities rather than infinite number of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate size rather than infinitely small size and the statistical fluctuations. In this paper, we proceed further and analysis the performance of the sending-or-not QKD under the above real-life assumptions.
First, we need reveal the decoy-state method with only a few different intensities and a phase slice of appropriate size to estimate the lower bound of the yield and the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate for the singlephoton state. Furthermore, we also need to consider the statistical fluctuations. In order to make the utmost decrease the effect of statistical fluctuations, the instances for basis unmatched are also used to estimate the lower bound of the yield for the single-photon state.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we shall first review the four-intensity decoystate method for sending-or-not QKD, and then perform a statistical fluctuation analysis on it in Sec. III. We then present the numerical simulation results in Sec. IV. The article is ended in Sec. V with a concluding remark.
II. THE DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH A FEW DIFFERENT INTENSITIES AND A PHASE SLICE OF APPROPRIATE SIZE
In the four-intensity decoy-state sending-or-not protocol, Alice and Bob randomly choose the X-window (decoy pulses) and Z-window (signal pulses) to send or not to send a phase-randomized coherent pulse to an untrusted party, Charlie, who is expected to perform interference measurement. When one and only one of the two detectors clicks, Charlie obtains an effective event. Then Alice and Bob can distill the final secret key with postselection and post-processing. The protocol is detailed below.
1. Alice and Bob repeat Steps 2-3, N times. All the public announcements by the legitimate users Alice and Bob are done over an authenticated channel.
2. Alice and Bob randomly choose X-window and Zwindow with probabilities p X and 1 − p X respectively. In X-window, both Alice and Bob prepare and send the decoy pulses. Explicitly they randomly choose three sources ρ αi with probability p i for i = 0, 1, 2, where ρ α0 = |0 0| is the vacuum source, ρ α1 and ρ α2 are two coherent sources with intensity µ 1 and µ 2 (µ 1 < µ 2 ) respectively. In Z-window, Alice (Bob) randomly prepares and sends the coherent state ρ αz with probability p z and sends nothing else.
3. Charlie measures the incoming signals and records which detector clicks. When the quantum communication is over, he publicly announces all the information about the detection event. The situation when one and only one detector (detector 0 or detector 1) makes a count is denoted as an effective event. Alice and Bob collect all the data with effective events and discard all the others.
4. Alice and Bob announce the basis information (Xwindow or Z-window) firstly. Then they announce the bit values and phase information corresponding to the effective events when Alice or Bob choose X-window. With these information, Alice and Bob obtain the observable N jk (j, k = 0, 1, 2, z) being the number of instances when Alice and Bob send state ρ αj and ρ α k respectively. Correspondingly, the lowercases n jk are used to denote the number of effective events. The yields can be defined as S jk = n jk /N jk . Explicitly, we have
where p 0 = 1 − p 1 − p 2 is the probability to send a vacuum pulse in X-window, N X = p 2 X N is the number of instances when both Alice and Bob choose X-window and N XZ = p X (1 − p X )N is the number of instances when Alice chooses X-window and Bob chooses Z-window.
5.
Define two sets C ∆ + and C ∆ − that contain the instances when both Alice and Bob send ρ 1 in X-window with the phase information θ A and θ B falling into the slice |θ A −θ B | ≤ ∆/2 and |θ A −θ B − π| ≤ ∆/2 respectively. The number of instances in
The number of effective events corresponding to C ∆ ± are denoted by n
and n ∆ ± 1 11 for detector 0 and detector 1 respectively. 6. With these observable in Step.5, Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bound of s 1 and the upper bound of e ph 1 by using the decoy-state methods shown below. Then the post-processing can be performed and the final key length can be calculated with the following formula
In the above protocol, Alice and Bob prepare and send the coherent pulses with randomized phase. The traditional formulas of decoy-state method can be applied directly. The coherent state whose phase is selected uniformly at random can be regard as a mixture of photon number states
where µ j = |α j | 2 is the intensity of the coherent state |α j . Then the state when Alice decides not sending and Bob decides to send ρ α k is ρ α0α k = e −µ k ∞ n=0 µ n k n! |0n 0n|. With these convex forms, the lower bound of the yield of the state ρ z0 = |01 01| can be written into the following form
where the observable S 0k are the yield of the sources ρ 0k for k = 1, 2, S 00 is the yield when both Alice and Bob send the vacuum state. Similarly, the lower bound of the yield of the state ρ z1 = |10 10| can be written as
where the observable S j0 are the yield of the sources when Alice sends the coherent state ρ j and Bob sends the vacuum state for j = 1, 2. With Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), the lower bound of the yield of single-photon state in Z-basis, i.e., the state ρ
, has the following form
Note
With this replacement, source ρ 2 is not used actually, then the four-intensity decoy-state method can be simplified to a three-intensity decoy-state method by taking p 2 = 0. On the one hand, the three-intensity decoy-state method can be carried out easily in experiment. On the other hand, if we are not attention to the limit security distance but the usability key rate practically (such as 10 −6 per-pulse), the key rate of the three-intensity decoystate method is only a little lower than (less than one percent for the cases discussed in the numerical simulation) the results for the four-intensity decoy-state method.
In
Similarly, we also have
In Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), the k-photon twin-field state |ψ δ + n is defined as follows
where δ = θ A − θ B . For the state in set C ∆ + , the phase is selected uniformly at random in the slice with |θ A −θ B | ≤ ∆/2. Equivalently, in set C ∆ + , the phase θ B chosen by Bob in |α
can be regarded as uniformly distributed in [0, 2π) and the phase θ A chosen by Alice satisfies the condition |δ| ≤ ∆/2. For any fixed value δ, we have
Considering the single-photon twin-field states in C ∆ = C ∆ + ∪ C ∆ − for a fixed δ, we have
So we know that the single-photon states in set C ∆ and in Z-basis have the same density matrices. The probability to emit a single-photon pulse from C ∆ is q 1 = 2µ 1 e −2µ1 . With this relations, we know that the bit-flip error rate of single-photon state in set C ∆ is equal to the phaseflip error rate e ph 1 asymptotically. The bit-flip error rate for all instances in set C ∆ can be calculated with the observable as follows
Attribute all the error to the single-photon state and the vacuum state, the upper bound of phase-flip error rate e ph 1 is
where s Z 1 is the lower bound of s Z 1 given in Eq. (6) . Then the final key rate of per pulse can be calculated with
where R is the final key rate, a 1 = µ z e −µz is the probability to emit a single-photon state from source ρ z , s 1 is the yield of the single-photon state in Z-window when one party from Alice and Bob decides to send a signal states, e ph 1 is the phase-flip error rate for those instance of s 1 , S Z and E Z are the yield and bit-flip error rate for instances when both Alice and Bob choose Z-window.
III. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS
In the real protocol, in order to extract the secure final key, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations. To obtain the lower bound value for s 1 and the upper bound value for e ph 1 in the real protocol with finite N , one can implement the idea of Ref. [13] , i.e., treating the averaged yield. Accordingly, define S as the mean value of yield S. Note that even though S jk (j, k = 0, 1, 2, z) are known values directly observed in the experiment, the mean values S jk are not. However, given the observed values S jk and the corresponding number of pulse pairs, the confidence lower and upper limits of S jk can be calculated.
In order to obtain a tighter lower bound of s Z 1 , we need introduce the following two yields
Replacing the observed yields with their mean values in Eq. (6) and Eq. (15) we can formulate the lower bound of respectively. Explicitly, we have
and
with
By using the multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound [17] , with a fixed failure probability ǫ, we can give an interval of S k with the observable S k , [S k , S k ], which can bound the value of S k with a probability of at least 1 − ǫ.
With the mean values s 
With the lower bound of s 1 and the upper bound of e ph 1 in Eq. (22), the final key rate can be calculated with Eq. (16) .
Note: In Eq.(19), by using the method shown in [17] , we can treat the observable S 2 and S 00 jointly when we considering the effect of statistical fluctuation. Then we obtain a tighter lower bound of s shown in Eq. (19) and Eq. (20) respectively. The final key is simply the worst-case result over all possible values for S 00 ∈ [S 00 , S 00 ]. S 00 has a teeny effect on the final key rate as its value is small comparing to the others. With the results of numerical simulations, we conclude that the final key rate only be improved just a little (less than 0.1 percent) by using these improved methods.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we present some results of the numerical simulation. We focus on the symmetric case where the two channel transmissions from Alice to Charlie and from Bob to Charlie are equal. We also assume that Charlie's detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rates and detection efficiencies, and their detection efficiencies do not depend on the incoming signals. We shall estimate what values would be probably observed in the normal cases by the linear models as previously. The values of the experimental parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table I. We optimize all parameters, p X , p 1 , p 2 p z , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ z and ∆ by the method of full optimization. The results of optimized key rate with different number of pulse pairs by four-inensity decoy-state method are shown in Fig. 1 .
In it, we use the red solid line to denote the asymptotic results with infinite number of pulses. The optimal key rate with different number of pulse pairs N = 10 14 , N = 10 13 and N = 10 12 are shown by the blue dotted line, the green dash-dot line and the black dashed line respectively. In Fig. 2 , we plot the final key rates with the four-intensity decoy-state method and the threeintensity decoy-state method when the number of pulse pairs N = 10 12 . We can see that the optimal key rates for the three-intensity decoy-state method is nearly equal to the results for the four-intensity decoy-state method when we are attention to the usability key rate practically (such as 10 −6 per-pulse). The improvement becomes more and more evident when we are regard to the long distance communication. In Fig. 3 , we plot the optimal value of ∆ for different distances with N = 10 12 by four-inensity decoy-state method.
Also, according to the observed data there [19] , we use a linear loss model to estimate the actual loss in the experiment for 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fiber (0.16 dB/km). Assuming the same device parameter (p d = 7.2 × 10 −8 , η d = 0.5525, f = 1.16, ǫ = 1.0 × 10 −10 , e a = 2% and N = 6.0 × 10 14 ), we make the optimization by using our sending-or-not protocol with the four-intensity decoy-state method shown above. We obtain a final key rate of 141 bit per second (bps), which is more than 4.4 × 10 5 times higher than the reported experimental result, 3.2 × 10 −4 bps.
V. CONCLUSION
In real setups of QKD, the practical situations with a few different intensities rather than infinite number of different intensities, a phase slice of appropriate size rather than infinitely small size and the statistical fluctuations must be considered. We first present the decoystate method with a few different intensities and a phase slice of appropriate size. Then we show that the decoystate method is a highly practical scheme even when the statistical fluctuations are considered. Numerical simulation shows that, the performance of our method is comparable to the asymptotic case for which the key size is large enough. Our results show that practical implementations of the sending-or-not quantum key distribution can be both secure and efficient.
